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Whilst everyone would like to share their success stories, very few have the confidence to share their failures. 
There should be no shame in experimenting and 
failing, especially with new communication 
technologies. As Microsoft founder, Bill Gates, 
has been quoted as saying: “It’s fine to celebrate 
success but it is more important to heed the 
lessons of failure.” With this in mind, CTA 
launched a call for papers on failed ICT4Ag 
projects/initiatives – projects that showed early 
promise and received third-party support (from 
governments, donor agencies or private sector 
investors) but did not reach fruition. 
Around 30 proposals were received, of which 
nine were chosen for further study, covering 
cases in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uganda, Zambia, and three cases from Kenya. 
These nine covered projects had planned to 
address perceived weaknesses in agricultural 
development, including a lack of extension, poor 
knowledge of markets, and insufficient 
understanding of inputs. This publication draws 
mainly from those case studies but also makes 
use of other sources, such as the World Bank’s 
ICT in Agriculture Sourcebook, as well as some 
of the unsuccessful proposals submitted to CTA. 
The potential for ICTs in agricultural 
development is almost endless and 
numerous applications are being developed
The potential for ICTs in agricultural 
development is almost endless and numerous 
applications are being developed. ICTs can be 
used to carry out soil tests; to apply fertiliser; 
to receive extension advice and weather forecasts; 
to monitor pests and diseases; to make marketing 
decisions; to decide when to harvest; to weigh 
produce in the field; to send and receive 
payments, including credit; to monitor produce 
during transport and storage; to improve 
transport, wholesale and retail logistics; and to 
generally upgrade management efficiency.  
The case studies reviewed here mainly discuss 
ICTs that seem most relevant to ACP 
smallholders, i.e. those that planned to offer 
extension and marketing information. ‘Relevance’ 
is here defined both in terms of the information 
to be provided and of the capacity of 
smallholders to use and pay for the ICTs. While 
some other services may indeed have 
considerable potential value for small-scale 
farmers, both their ability to pay for them and 
the ability of governments to offer them as a 
‘public good’ must, despite some acknowledged 
successes, often be questionable.
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ICTs for agriculture:  
Nine issues to address from day one
Based both on research carried out for CTA and on other sources, the following 
lessons highlight the main issues that should be taken into account when 
designing, introducing and scaling-up ICT4Ag projects. 
1. Involve all the potential users when   
 assessing demand
Too often, developers look at whether an 
information and communication technology 
(ICT) application is suitable for agricultural use 
without first assessing the demand. No project 
design should begin without detailed 
consultations with the intended users, such as 
farmers, traders and extension workers. 
Consultations should first aim to identify their 
agricultural needs and, only after this has been 
done, should project developers consider whether 
these needs could be met successfully by ICTs. 
Further, both demand and impact need to be 
assessed on an ongoing basis through rigorous 
monitoring and evaluation. 
2. Keep it simple 
There is often a tendency to want to provide all 
the information and assistance that farmers 
could possibly need. This can lead to complex, 
costly, unworkable and unsustainable designs. 
For example, projects aiming to supply extension 
information sometimes run into difficulties in 
sourcing appropriate content. A better approach 
is to start by providing limited information to 
address a core problem, with the intention to 
upgrade and scale-up services if the pilot is 
successful.
3. Do not pre-commit to any particular ICT 
 solution
The need for the relatively new ICTs (such as 
mobile phones, the web, etc.) should not be 
assumed as, in some cases, they may not 
represent the best solution to farmers’ problems. 
To address some problems, more traditional 
ICTs, such as radios, may be the answer. In yet 
other cases, a mixture of new and traditional 
ICTs may be the best approach. Whichever 
solution is proposed, it is essential that this is 
based on cost-effectiveness and sustainability 
and not just on the fact that it is desirable and 
technically possible.
4. Address literacy, gender and social issues 
 from the outset
The use of mobile phones and the internet often 
runs up against problems of both illiteracy and 
the ability of the target beneficiaries to use the 
technology. Providing services in languages 
understood by most people is essential. Beware 
that women are sometimes denied access to 
technology, even though they are frequently able 
to make better use of the information provided 
than men. Communities may have strong 
traditional information and knowledge-sharing 
approaches, as well as trust-based marketing 
relationships with traders, and ICT4Ags should 
promote the continuation of such traditional 
practices.
Providing services in languages understood 
by most people is essential
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5. Consider the project cost
Externally funded projects are invariably too 
costly to be supported by governments once 
donor funds have run out. Donors need to 
rigorously examine the capacity of the hosting 
organisation to continue implementing activities 
after the project. They should design projects 
with sustainability in mind rather than because 
they have a certain budget to spend. 
Governments need to say no to donor support 
if they feel they cannot guarantee sustainability. 
Exit strategies must also address who will replace 
consulting firms that may have done much of 
the initial work in implementing a project.
6. Work with existing service providers
It is essential that extension staff do not feel 
threatened by ICT introduction. Increased 
availability of information requires qualified 
staff able to help farmers to use it. ICTs for 
extension purposes should not be designed to 
replace traditional extension methods but to 
supplement them and help the extension service 
staff in both the field and headquarters to 
function more effectively.
7. Develop a viable ‘business model’
Technology specialists who decide to develop 
ICT4Ag applications are often not very 
business-minded. They may need to seek 
specialist advice that can assess the profit 
potential of their ICTs before too much money 
Beware that women are sometimes denied 
access to technology, even though they are 
frequently able to make better use of the 
information provided than men














9. Resolve responsibilities to implement 
  the service
Project developers sometimes design a system 
while paying little heed to who will actually be 
required to implement it. It is essential that all 
management and operational issues are resolved 
from the outset and that a new service is both 
confident of the competence of the planned 
implementers and has the full support of 
management. The explosion in mobile phone 
usage in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries has come about, in large part, because 
governments have l iberal ised the 
telecommunications sector, thereby allowing 
private companies to compete to supply phones 
and networks that people find affordable. This 
emphasises the importance of the enabling 
environment for development. Governments 
need to be aware that other existing or new 
regulations may also affect the business 
environment and constrain further growth of 
the ICT sector by, for example, inhibiting 
innovation or limiting network expansion. On 
the specific topic of ICT4Ag, national and local 
governments, once they have endorsed a new 
project, need to provide consistent support to 
its implementation. 
is invested. How ICT services expect to generate 
revenue; whether or not the beneficiaries will 
be prepared to pay for information and how 
much they will be prepared to pay; the 
opportunities for external contributions; and 
how to control costs so that they are in line with 
the revenue must all be addressed. Similarly, 
government and donor projects also need a 
business model in order to assess the potential 
for sustainability.
8. Do not ignore training, promotion and 
  information requirements
Project budgets invariably underestimate or 
ignore the training requirements needed for an 
ICT service to work. Training is required at all 
levels, from those supervising the service to the 
farmer receiving the information, and this can 
involve considerable costs, including travel costs. 
Similarly, promotion of a service is essential for 
people to know that it is available, but promotion 
is also sometimes unbudgeted.
SUSTAINABILITY LESSONS
Communities may have strong traditional 
information and knowledge-sharing 
approaches, as well as trust-based 
marketing relationships with traders, and 
ICT4Ags should promote the continuation of 
such traditional practices
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Women and children from Mugeyo, Rwanda, take part in a survey aimed at understanding the links between agriculture and nutrition and 































ICT4Ag projects all start with sound objectives. One from Uganda (see Case 9) aimed to increase agricultural efficiency and 
effectiveness in order to improve livelihoods, 
food security and sustainability. Many of the 
other failed projects had similar objectives. But, 
despite such aims, developing the projects rarely 
involved talking to farmers, traders and extension 
officers. An almost universal feature was that 
developers, perhaps encouraged by the success 
of ICTs for other uses in rural areas, such as 
mobile money, tended to put all their emphasis 
on the ICT. In some cases this led them to 
design applications or systems that the users 
may not really have needed or that they did need 
but could not afford. Several designed 
‘sledgehammers to crack nuts’; solutions that 
tried to do much more than was really required. 
Others designed technologically sound systems, 
but these assumed the availability of content 
that was not necessarily available, such as 
information needed to provide extension advice. 
ICT4Ag projects should emerge from detailed 
research into problems facing the intended 
beneficiaries. Where background research was 
conducted for the cases studied it was usually 
to assess the technical capacity to use the ICT 
Assessing demand from users for 
services to be provided  
through ICTs
A common mistake has been to concentrate on the technology rather than on the 
problem that technology is meant to solve. ICT4Ag projects have often assumed 
that they know what problems farmers and others face but have frequently failed 
to actually ask them. 
(e.g. percentage of farmers with mobile phones 
and smartphones; network coverage; internet 
connectivity) rather than the benefits that the 
technology could achieve or the ability of the 
target beneficiaries to use the technology. Some 
quotes from the case studies illustrate the point:
“None of us have any real background in 
agriculture but at that time we saw an opening 
for greater ICT involvement in the industry”; 
“We were trying to be too ambitious from the 
start”; “We did not understand the needs of 
farmers and did not associate them in 
development of the application”.
Two projects in Ghana (Case 2) planned to use 
ICTs to help farmers with access to credit and 
markets, collective marketing training, business 
planning, record keeping, pest control, and farm 
management, as well as fertiliser application, 
planting and spacing. A project in Kenya, not 
covered by the case studies, aimed to develop a 
system to help youth and farmers access 
information on a wide range of topics related 
to agricultural technology and link them with 
technology providers, to help farmers access 
markets, interact with policymakers and create 
employment. Given the weaknesses that many 
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national extension services face, it was perhaps 
realistic to feel that farmers faced problems in 
getting information on agricultural topics. 
However, the breadth of coverage proposed 
caused many complications and involved 
significant costs. 
An important factor to emerge from the studies 
was that for some types of information, 
particularly for agricultural extension, farmers 
were more comfortable in talking to people they 
knew, such as input dealers or extension workers, 
than in obtaining information anonymously by 
phone or text. Case 1, presented in this chapter, 
gives an example of this from Kenya, where a 
service aimed to provide advice by mobile phone 
on appropriate maize varieties but farmers 
preferred alternative information sources. In 
addition, farmers were unsure why the service 
was being offered in the first place. They 
considered that seed recommendations changed 
so rarely that it was not needed.
The assumption that seed dealers were only 
interested in selling slow-moving seed lines, not 
in helping farmers, was one of the reasons for the 
establishment of the Kenyan seed ICT. Similarly, 
other projects seem to have started from the 
standpoint that farmers were exploited by traders 
(the so-called ‘middlemen’). This assumed 
exploitation is common in many types of 
development projects, but is not generally 
supported by independent research. The 
assumption that traditional trading relationships 
are exploitative1 led several projects to seek ways 
of ‘by-passing the middleman’ electronically, by 
enabling farmers or farmer groups to identify new 
buyers or to announce products for sale online. 
While much agricultural trading around the 
world is conducted electronically, this is generally 
done in a very structured way. Electronic trading 
CHAPTER 1 / Assessing demand from users
requires a common understanding between the 
buyer and seller about the product description. 
While most ACP countries do have grades and 
standards, they are not yet commonly used at 
the level of the small-scale farmer. Further, both 
parties must be confident that the transaction 
will be conducted honestly. Commodity 
exchanges can provide this but are not suitable 
for individual small-scale farmers. 
Small traders who purchase directly from farmers 
often work in a limited area, where they have 
developed long-term trading relationships. They 
are unlikely to consider purchasing by using 
ICTs unless they can be sure that agreements 
made online or over the phone will be honoured. 
Similarly, knowledge of higher prices in a 
location not usually supplied by the farmer has 
little value because of the cost or risk involved 
in supplying that location2. Not having 
adequately researched the situation in advance, 
several projects eventually found that trust 
relationships were perhaps more important to 
farmers than always being able to get the best 
possible price. Farmers preferred to go to market 
to get prices and sell to existing clients. The 
projects also found limited interest on the part 
of traders to promote their businesses through 
ICTs. 
In conclusion, it is important that developers 
of ICT applications and systems should carry 
out a detailed assessment of the need for the 
planned service. This need should not just be 
assumed but should be verified after detailed 
consultations with the intended beneficiaries. 
How do farmers and others get information 
now? Are they happy with their information 
sources? What do they think of the idea of 
supplying information and advice using ICTs? 
Which ICTs do they feel would best meet their 
needs? n
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CASE 1 Maize Seed SMS information services
The Kenya Seed Company (KSC) is a government parastatal that researches, develops and markets high-yielding seeds for 
a variety of crops. Prior to setting up the Maize Seed 
SMS service it was already embracing use of ICTs; 
providing a toll-free line for customer enquiries, giving 
extension advice over FM radio stations and allowing 
farmers to pay for seeds through Kenya’s M-Pesa 
mobile money transfer service.
The SMS service was established to help farmers 
decide which maize variety was the right one for 
their agro-climatic zone. It was felt that farmers 
were confused by seed company promotion that 
was generic rather than location-specific and, as a 
result, they planted the wrong varieties for their 
area. ICTs had already been used by others to 
provide advice on seed varieties in Kenya, including 
websites, radio programmes and videos. A supplier 
of cotton seeds had used mobile phones to help 
farmers choose the right variety and calculate how 
much seed to use.
The decision to use SMS was made because Kenya 
has a high level of mobile phone usage and network 
coverage in almost all of the country. 
The system required farmers to send a text message 
specifying their division (an administrative unit). 
Information about appropriate varieties had already 
been preloaded and the system would automatically 
search the database and then send a reply. Additional 
information, such as the seeding rate and the KSC 
price, was also provided.
Take-up of the service was disappointing. In 2013 
only 2,000 enquiries were received, compared to 
the break-even number of 24,000. Interviews 
suggested that farmers did not understand how to 
use the system and illiteracy was also a problem. 
Moreover, the system used English rather than local 
languages. Promotion of the service had been top-
down and carried out by KSC’s Head Office rather 
than by its own extension staff and government 
extension officers, who felt no ownership. Finally, 
farmers noted that maize recommendations rarely 
changed and that they could, anyway, get the 
required information from KSC depots and 
extension staff. There would have been more interest 
in the service if it had covered a variety of crop 
seeds.
Country: Kenya
Implementing party: Kenya Seed Company (KSC)
Type of service: SMS
Project duration: 2008 – present
Source: Wamweya, Jacqueline W. and Mary W. Mutiga: Government  ICTs  for Agriculture: Lessons from the 
failed Maize Seed SMS Information Services in Kenya.  
 13 
CHAPTER 2













Considering technical difficulties 
with the development and use of 
ICT solutions
When it comes to software development, existing software that is tried and tested 
is often ignored in favour of ‘starting from scratch’.  Other technical problems 
faced by developers have included equipment provision, network coverage, poor 
phone lines and poor access to electricity. 
Several case studies report on technical difficulties experienced during software development. In the case of one, from 
Trinidad and Tobago (Case 3), the proposed 
service never went ‘live’ because the problems, 
while not insurmountable, could not be resolved 
with the available time and money. Other 
projects, including Case 2 presented in this 
chapter, experienced difficulties with 
cross-platform compatibility, meaning that the 
services had problems in being read on mobile 
phones. Finally, one of the case studies (Case 
4) reported difficult relationships with the 
telecommunications company, with frequent 
breakdowns in the service.
An ICT project designed to improve monitoring 
and evaluation of agricultural projects in Kenya 
(Case 6) only became aware of its unsuitability 
for use by extension officers after considerable 
work and expenditure. A similar problem 
reported from Zambia (Case 8), when a platform 
that worked well during the testing phase proved 
unsuitable during the pilot stage and was thus 
not scaled up. 
In general, projects found that failing to get the 
system right from the start led to numerous 
modifications and additional costs. Redesigning 
a system may also necessitate additional training. 
A common feature of the case studies is that 
developers set out to be innovative in their 
software design, as opposed to building on 
existing platforms. While ICT4Ag platforms 
that have a proven track record may initially 
appear costly to governments and donors, they 
have already addressed some of the problems. 
As a result, they may turn out less expensive and 
more functional than the alternative of 
‘reinventing the wheel’. 
Equipment problems faced included damage to 
a server due to failure to install a power stabiliser, 
and the purchase by a ministry of computers 
that were inferior to the software designer’s 
recommendations. Equipment provision 
envisaged at the stage of project design was 
sometimes not carried through, leaving field 
staff with insufficient tools for implementation. 
Sometimes, insufficient machines were provided, 
leaving no backup when one broke down. Even 
where adequate equipment is supplied (often 
by donors) there can be problems because of 
inadequate funds to meet operating costs. For 
example, government offices sometimes have 
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shiny new computers but no money to pay 
internet provider fees, or brand new printers 
but no money to pay for toner (ink) or paper. 
Although network coverage is expanding rapidly, 
some of the case studies reported that many rural 
areas in Africa remain poorly served. In countries 
where there are several service providers, one 
may have good coverage of a particular area and 
others poor coverage. If farmers make cross-
network calls they have to pay higher fees; but 
if the ICT4Ag makes the service available on 
all networks it incurs extra expenses. 
Traditional land lines are also often of poor 
quality and this has an impact on the speed of 
internet connection. The problem can be 
overcome by linking computers to mobile phone 
networks, but this may be difficult and costly 
Developers need to be fully aware of the 
capacity of the intended users to utilise 
their software and of the suitability of 
available hardware and communications 
systems to implement what is proposed
for governments, resulting in problems for 
services aiming to support extension officers 
through web-based applications.  
A problem faced by farmers is that of recharging 
their phones, as electricity is often not available. 
Entrepreneurs offer recharging services, using 
car batteries or solar panels, but such services 
are often remote from farms. Farmers may leave 
their phones switched off until they want to 
make a call, which could present problems for 
services that aim to ‘push’ voice calls. A relatively 
recent development may overcome some of these 
problems. Spark Africa has taken advantage of 
the widespread use of bicycles in Kenya to 
develop a low-cost charger that can be attached 
to the cycle’s dynamo3.
In conclusion, while agricultural ICTs clearly 
need to foster innovation, developers do need 
to be aware of other similar solutions that could 
be built on. Further, developers need to be fully 
aware of the capacity of the intended users to 
utilise their software and of the suitability of 
available hardware and communications systems 
to implement what is proposed.n
CHAPTER 2 / Considering technical difficulties
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CASE 2
Two e-extension platforms were developed in Ghana over the same period during 2012-13. One was supported by the 
German technical assistance agency, GIZ, as part 
of a broader agricultural development project in 
Ghana, while the other was funded by the World 
Bank under a West African regional project. 
Software development was carried out by two 
separate private companies in the capital, Accra.
Despite the fact that both projects envisaged 
platforms to be implemented by the Directorate of 
Agricultural Extension Services (DAES) of the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture, they were 
remarkably similar in their conception. However, 
http://www.e-extensionmofa.com/home placed its 
main emphasis on servicing field officers, whereas 
http://agricextension.gov.gh was more oriented to 
the farmer. Both sites were planned to be mobile 
phone enabled.
Plans for both of the sites were very ambitious. They 
were intended to offer up-to-date information on 
crop, livestock and fisheries production as well as 
weather forecasts and market prices. They also 
planned to offer hotlines where farmers could call 
for additional information; newsletters, extension 
brochures and posters; a good search function; 
videos; two-way SMS; interactive voice response 
(IVR); an online forum, and contact information 
for extension staff. Additionally, it was hoped that 
the platforms could be used by DAES staff to carry 
out bulk mailing of SMS extension messages.
Although both sites were still online at the 
beginning of 2015, neither contained much usable 
information and it was clear that DAES had not 
been able to upload the content envisaged during 
the planning stage. Moreover, neither project had 
succeeded in developing a cross-platform capacity 
so that mobile phones could be used to access the 
sites. Various reasons were given for these problems, 
including the fact that donor funds had run out, 
poor planning and consultation with the intended 
users, and a lack of advance consideration of how 
information would be developed and maintained 
on the site and who would be responsible for this.
Country: Ghana
Implementing parties: Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA); Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ); World Bank
Type of service: Web sites; call centres (planned); SMS and interactive voice response (IVR) (planned)
Project duration: 2012 – present




The projects that planned to use ICTs to supply agricultural extension information all recognised that they needed a 
database of information that could be the basis 
for a website, text messages, interactive voice 
messaging, or call centre operations. There was 
a tendency to assume that the content would 
be easy to obtain, but this was often not the 
case. Either the information was not available 
or it was only in English or French.
Content development was particularly difficult 
for those projects where staff lacked any 
agricultural background. Indeed, as reported in 
Case 3, one ICT team found that it became a 
victim of the problem it was trying to solve, i.e. 
a lack of information. Almost all projects 
discovered that building up relevant information 
resources required significant time and money 
and that content of direct relevance to the 
country was not easily available from the 
internet. For some that realisation was effectively 
the end of the project. Others still have websites 
on line but they contain little useful content. In 
addition to supplying extension information, 
Building up appropriate  
content for delivery through  
simple technologies
Delivering information to farmers through ICTs requires a database of 
information that can be easily accessed. Moreover, it needs to be in languages that 
farmers can understand. Content development can represent a major cost that is  
often overlooked. 
several case study projects also intended to 
repackage existing resources to provide 
information on the weather and on market 
prices. However, few succeeded in achieving 
this, with problems related to cost and the user 
interface of the applications. 
In conclusion, the GSM Association4 
recommends the following points for developing 
content in mobile agricultural services. Content 
should be: i) actionable – farmers should be able 
to act on the information and advice delivered, 
within the capacity and constraints of their 
operating environment; ii) timely – information 
and advisory services must be available when 
farmers need them; iii) relevant – information 
and advisory services must be applicable to the 
farmer’s situation with regards to location, agro-
climactic zone, crop cycle, farming activity and 
language, amongst others; iv) accurate and high 
quality – there should be a high level of quality 
and accuracy of information, and advisory 
services must be available at all times to build 
trust of farmers in the service.n
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CASE 3
Carib Cultivate was designed to provide farmers in Trinidad and Tobago with information on the production of a range 
of crops, covering topics such as germination and 
growth periods, common diseases and pathogens, 
pests and pesticides, and fertilisers. Unfortunately, 
despite the idea having won two competitive grants, 
the service has yet to be made available to the 
farming community.
The five software developers, who were all working 
towards advanced degrees in Computer Science, 
planned to develop an online repository of 
agricultural data. Taking advantage of the 
inexpensive availability of 3G and 4G networks in 
the country, and the widespread use of smartphones, 
they set out to develop an app that could be used 
on both Android and iOS (iPhone) devices. They 
also planned for the app to allow for caching so 
that farmers could access previously viewed pages 
if they were out of range of a network signal.
In trying to take the software to a stage where it 
could be launched the developers faced three major 
problems. First, they were victims of the problem 
they were trying to solve. In attempting to build 
up content on agricultural topics they had trouble 
identifying information relevant to the Caribbean. 
Not being agriculturalists they ended up hiring an 
agricultural consultant to do this work but, even 
then, there were clear information deficits. Second, 
the designers faced a number of technical difficulties 
in getting the user interface to work. Further delays 
were encountered, in part, as a result of the 
developers wanting to aim for perfection. As time 
progressed they found that some features they had 
wanted to include had to be dropped, such as a GPS 
capacity. Finally, with all the difficulties experienced, 
Carib Cultivate had to be put on the back burner 
as the time of the developers was taken up with 
other work.
Country: Trinidad and Tobago
Implementing party: AgriWorks4u
Type of service: Mobile phone app
Project duration: 2011 – present
Source: Bascombe, Keron: Issues in Mobile App Creation for Agriculture in Trinidad and Tobago. 










Strengthening the capacity of 
small-scale farmers to use ICTs
Most case studies highlight the difficulties faced by farmers in using ICTs. These 
can be summarised as both language and ICT-literacy constraints, combined with 
cultural and other sensitivities. 
The average age of farmers is increasing 
everywhere. While farmers can often rely on 
their children or on more literate neighbours to 
help them to decipher text or web messages, 
there may be a cultural reluctance to admit to 
illiteracy. Moreover, someone who is literate 
may not be available when the farmer really 
needs to read a message5. A further problem 
concerns the language used. For example, there 
are 42 languages in Kenya and most people do 
not speak either Kiswahili or English, the 
languages generally used by ICT services. 
As younger farmers replace their parents and 
grandparents there should be a gradual increase 
in average farmer literacy. However, it will be 
some decades before illiteracy is no longer a 
major problem in rural areas. Until then, 
ICT4Ag will need to engage in a complicated 
juggling act: to identify ways of reaching as 
many illiterate farmers as possible while, at the 
same time, to ensure that costs are controlled 
and revenue is maximised. For example, one 
response to illiteracy has been to identify literate 
farmer leaders who can seek information or 
receive messages on behalf of a group of farmers. 
In terms of information dissemination this can 
work well, but supplying information to groups 
rather than individuals can reduce revenue-
earning opportunities, particularly if the 
recipient organisations have limited resources. 
Voice messages do, of course, overcome illiteracy 
and Case 4 in this chapter reports that farmers, 
when contacted, showed a strong initial 
preference for receiving voice information. 
However, the farmer recipient of voice messages 
does have to remember the message. He or she 
cannot refer to an SMS text as a reminder. When 
messages are fairly complex, for example, 
concerning seeding rates, relying on a voice 
message could be dangerous. Voice is also more 
expensive than SMS and, while voice messages 
may be suitable to replace brief text messages, 
they may not be suitable as a replacement for 
lengthy web-based extension messages that can 
be downloaded by a smartphone. In the long 
run, services may have to be multi-channel, 
offering both SMS and voice messages and 
eventually providing a call centre, as farmers 
will want to call back for clarification and 
additional information, particularly when facing 
an urgent problem6.
The general ageing of farmers is also a problem 
in regard to their ability to use mobile phones. 
Although there has been an explosion in phone 
use recently, evidence suggests that they are still 
mainly being used by farmers to make traditional 
voice calls. Children are now familiar with 
smartphones and relatively inexpensive 
smartphones are available, but young people are 
not farmers. Some of the studies reported that 
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farmers had difficulties in using the ICTs, 
particularly where interactive services, 
smartphones or websites were involved. One 
study highlighted the problems faced by farmers 
in remembering the number to call to access a 
service: shorter numbers that were easier to 
remember could have been purchased from the 
telecommunications company, but the cost was 
too high. Close liaison with the mobile network 
operators to explain the purpose of the request 
may overcome this and similar problems.
One study reported that farmers considered the 
internet as having mystical or spiritual aspects 
and were thus reluctant to use it. A more 
pragmatic reason given for farmers refusing to 
register for one site was that they feared that 
the information would be shared with the tax 
man and other government officials. 
As the use of ICT4Ag often encounters 
problems of both illiteracy and the ability of 
beneficiaries to use the technology, creative 
approaches to resolving these problems are 
required. Providing services in multiple 
languages is essential. Communities and 
community organisations may have strong 
existing knowledge-sharing approaches and 




N’KALÔ was established to provide market information to 23,000 cashew producers in Côte d’Ivoire. It was developed by an 
NGO, RONGEAD, and has employed a range of 
dissemination methods, including weekly newsletters 
sent by email and on paper; a weekly SMS message; 
field staff available to be consulted by ‘phone; a 
website (www.nkalo.com), which provides 
information on several crops in addition to cashew; 
‘spots’ on 37 local FM radio stations; and an IVR 
service for mobile phone users. From amongst these, 
N’KALÔ became convinced that radio and IVR 
were the most effective for farmers, who preferred 
to receive messages by voice rather than text. In 
addition to literacy issues, SMS messages were 
considered too short to convey the information 
required. However, neither of the voice services is 
functioning as originally planned.
The IVR service offered a choice of using French 
or the local language Dioula. Callers were then 
given a choice of five locations about which to 
receive targeted messages, at a cost of around €0.40 
for a two-minute call. However, problems were 
experienced, including technical breakdowns; the 
high cost of obtaining a simple number for farmers 
to remember; the fact that only one mobile network 
was used (due in part to the lack of compatibility 
between the systems used by the various companies 
and the cost of developing a specific IVR for each 
system); and the difficult relationship with the 
service provider that complicated message uploading 
and made obtaining use statistics difficult. Moreover, 
a survey found that farmers actually preferred to 
receive information from the people they knew. 
Consequently, the IVR service was closed down 
and replaced by a much-appreciated service that, 
over eight weeks, automatically called about 500 
farmer leaders to deliver recorded messages. The 
cost of this was €4,600 but, to date, RONGEAD 
has been unable to generate resources to scale-up.
N’KALÔ, which means “I am informed” in Dioula, 
had started by using radio stations but had trouble 
generating revenue. It has now changed to using 
radio primarily to advertise paid services, particularly 
a weekly SMS. In special situations, e.g. where there 
is abnormal weather or an unstable market, radio 
continues to be used to reach the largest possible 
number of producers.
Country: Côte d’Ivoire
Implementing parties: N’KALÔ; RONGEAD (NGO)
Type of service: IVR; SMS; radio
Project duration: 2011 – present
Source: Kedja, Serge: L’information sur les marchés agricoles via le serveur vocal interactif N’KALÔ et les radios 
de proximité – les limites d ’une approche innovante (Côte d ’Ivoire).
Interactive Voice Response ( IVR) and 
Radio for Market Information
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Considering costs for sustainability
Many development projects, and not just those concerning ICT4Ag, appear 
initially successful when the donor is actively involved, but have problems in 
continuing after the project has ended. In particular, services provided free of 
charge to farmers are often difficult to continue after donors have departed. 
Consideration of sustainability is essential right from the beginning of  
any project. 
Most of the case studies were donor-funded 
projects. In some cases the funds allocated were 
considerable. For example, the study of a call 
centre implemented in Kenya (Case 5) estimated 
that it had cost donors around €1.5 million, 
including salaries for 25 experts available to 
answer questions online. 
Donors tend to allocate funds in one go at the 
beginning of a project or, at best, in two or three 
chunks. Donor administrations are not usually 
equipped to handle projects that allocate 
resources on the basis of lessons learned and 
provide the time needed for the activities to 
become sustainable. There is rarely a possibility 
to start on a small-scale with limited objectives 
and expand as the project shows success. Donors 
may absorb costs at the beginning of a project 
with little attention to how those costs will be 
met at the end, other than through optimistic 
assertions that the service will be profitable by 
then. Staff and operating costs are met, with 
few realistic guarantees that the agency 
implementing the project will be able to 
subsequently cover those costs. Equipment is 
provided with little consideration of how it will 
be replaced. 
A common experience was that government 
agencies or, in one case, a private company, either 
did not have the resources to continue 
implementing the service once donor funds were 
exhausted or did not consider the activity a 
priority. Although ICT4Ag projects are often 
designed to address problems caused by resource 
constraints, such as inadequate extension 
services, ICTs may not overcome existing 
funding weaknesses. If anything, projects may 
increase costs in the long-term. 
The studies also suggested that insufficient 
attention was paid to the ancillary activities 
necessary for the core activities to work. This 
included lack of funds for extension workers to 
both be trained and do training and inadequate 
resources to generate the content necessary for 
the planned service, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
The willingness of farmers to use ICT services 
depends on how much they must pay. An SMS 
message to request information can cost €0.15 
in Zambia, while a call to an IVR service in 
Côte d’Ivoire costs more than twice that. This 
may not seem much, but measured against the 
daily income of many farmers in developing 
countries it is significant and farmers will need 
a lot of convincing that it is justified. Where 
ICT4Ag projects choose initially to provide 
information free of charge to farmers the 
problem is compounded when the project comes 
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to an end and farmers are suddenly faced with 
meeting the true costs of the service. 
The lesson from these experiences is perhaps 
that the best approach is to limit the number 
of activities implemented and the amount of 
content that is initially handled, leaving open 
the possibility of expanding if the initial 
application is successful and the beneficiaries 
exhibit a willingness to pay for the information. 
Donors need to identify how implementation 
will be continued after the project has been 
completed. ICT4Ag developers need to become 
more business-minded or seek specialist advice 
on how to make their ideas profitable. n
Donor administrations are not usually 
equipped to handle projects that allocate 
resources on the basis of lessons learned 
and provide the time needed for the 
activities to become sustainable














M-Kilimo has made valuable strides in identifying rural farmers’ information needs and explored some ways of 
structuring a business to deliver them. Having 
successfully launched the service, going forward 
focus will tighten on its sustainability and scalability, 
improving value for all. (GSMA, 2011)
M-Kilimo7, 8, a Kenyan farmer help line, was 
launched in 2009 by KenCall, an international call 
centre service provider based in Kenya, with funding 
by the Rockefeller Foundation through the GSM 
Association, for an 18-month pilot. KenCall 
recruited a team of 15 agricultural experts to provide 
this service, which was available to farmers between 
07:00 and 23:00 every day. These experts, who 
responded directly to farmers’ calls, were required 
to have a minimum of a Bachelor’s degree in 
Agriculture (while some of them had Master level 
or a PhD), with at least two years of field experience. 
The service was provided in a number of local 
languages and covered all areas of agricultural 
expertise, including horticulture, agricultural 
engineering, livestock and environmental and soil 
advice.
The system aimed to address weaknesses in the 
availability of extension services in Kenya and it 
was available across all three mobile networks and 
charged at a standard network rate. Callers were 
asked to provide information on their location, the 
farm size, the number of animals reared, crops and 
varieties planted, soil types, water sources and inputs 
used, in order to improve the quality of help that 
could be given and to build up a database of farmer 
information.
Despite initial constraints, especially expensive 
marketing and distribution for a third-party service 
provider, M-Kilimo was initially very successful, 
and reached over 20,000 users by 2010. However, 
four years after its establishment, M-Kilimo was 
no longer functioning. The high cost of operation 
meant that it could not be sustained once donor 
funding had run out. While there were possibilities 
to generate revenue by linking farmers with relevant 
businesses, such as fertiliser suppliers, this revenue 
was never fully explored. As KenCal lacks a capacity 
of a value-added service (VAS) provider and can’t 
provide or bill for SMS, IVR or any other automated 
channels, the prospects of recovering helpline costs 
were very low.
Country: Kenya
Implementing parties: KenCall; Rockefeller Foundation; GSMA mAgri
Type of service: Call centre
Project duration: 2009 – 2011
Source: Odhiambo, Michael D. and Tabitha A. Omoga: Failing to scale up in ICT for agriculture projects: learning the 
lessons from the field – A case of M-Kilimo a farmer help line set in Kenya.
M-Kil imo: A farmer help l ine
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Working with traditional extension 
service providers 
Traditional extension services still have much to offer. A frequent observation 
from the case studies was that farmers still prefer to receive information through 
personal contact. Resources therefore need to be allocated so that extension staff 
can utilise available ICT4Ag services to the full. 
CHAPTER 6 
It is essential that extension staff do not feel threatened by the introduction of ICTs. Increased availability of information requires 
qualified staff able to help farmers to use it. ICTs 
for extension purposes should not be designed 
to replace traditional extension methods but to 
supplement them and help them to function 
more effectively. Integrating ICTs into existing 
extension approaches will help minimise the 
illiteracy challenges associated with other 
approaches that by-pass extension agents. 
It is also important to ensure that extension 
officers both buy-in to an ICT4Ag project and 
are given the resources to enable them to 
implement it. If field officers lack computers 
and have poor internet connections, a service 
designed to provide more information to them, 
no matter how well-designed and implemented 
at headquarters level, will have limited impact 
in the field. Although not directly aimed at 
supporting farmers, the project to strengthen 
monitoring and evaluation of extension projects 
(Case 6), illustrates some of the difficulties that 
can be experienced.
Some of the case studies reported that farmers 
were reluctant to use information conveyed over 
the phone by an anonymous voice. This applied, 
in particular, to services designed to link farmers 
with markets or even just to provide market 
information, but farmers were also wary of 
receiving extension information in this way. 
These studies suggested that they much preferred 
to obtain information from face-to-face contact 
or by a phone call to people they already knew. 
In one case farmers were reportedly hostile to 
a phone-based market-linkage service, which 
they considered was designed to cheat them. 
Some of these difficulties may be overcome by 
encouraging farmer organisations to become 
ICT4Ag service providers. In this case the voices 
used should be those of farmer organisation 




Large-scale development projects require extensive monitoring and evaluation (M&E) so that the donor and the recipient agency 
can be sure all is going according to plan. ICTs can 
play an important role in facilitating efficient M&E.
Phase 1 of the National Agriculture and Livestock 
Extension Programme (NALEP) began in Kenya 
in 2000. It adopted a community mobilisation 
approach that identified priority crops and livestock 
and then established common interest groups and 
extension groups to ensure that adequate training 
was provided. This phase covered around half of 
the country. Phase 2, beginning in 2006, was 
extended to cover all of the then 70 districts in 
Kenya. Phase 1 had been criticised for the lack of 
suitable monitoring and for Phase 2 it was therefore 
decided to introduce an ICT-based M&E system.
The planned M&E arrangements required 
completion of reports by hand at divisional level 
for all common interest groups. This information 
was then loaded onto computers at the 70 district 
headquarters in the country and transferred by CD 
to one of the eight provincial headquarters 
for further processing.
The system rapidly became unmanageable. The vast 
amount of information required became impossible 
for extension staff to handle. They saw it as a burden 
rather than as a tool to improve their work. They 
were rarely fully computer literate and training was 
inadequate to address this weakness. Training 
unfortunately coincided with a widespread 
redeployment of Ministry of Agriculture staff in 
2006. Computers were only available at district level 
with none in the divisions, and transport constraints 
meant that staff had trouble getting to district offices 
to key-in the data. District offices had an insufficient 
number of computers for NALEP, and those 
available did not meet the software designers’ 
specifications. Further, the constant redesign of the 
data-entry screens led to a mismatch between the 
data entry requirements and the data actually 
collected in the field. These and other logistical 
problems meant that timely M&E reports were not 
being generated at national level. Finally, by 2012 
the number of districts in the country had expanded 
from 70 to 256; further complicating data collection, 
entry and transmission.
Monitor ing and evaluat ion of a  
development project in Kenya
Country: Kenya
Implementing parties: National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme (NALEP); Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)
Type of service: Computers and software
Project duration: 2000 – 2012

















Ensuring viable business models 
from the start
Technology specialists are often not very business-minded. They may need to seek 
specialist advice before too much money is invested. How to generate revenue; 
how and how much to charge the beneficiaries; the opportunities for external 
contributions; and how to keep costs in line with revenue must all be addressed. 
While, given the difficulty experienced by small 
farmers in paying for them, ICT-based services 
may well require continued donor and 
government support, it is important to generate 
some revenue. Where they are developed by the 
private sector it is, of course, essential that they 
have an income, even if donors are prepared to 
meet some of the cost. Covering costs is 
sometimes not considered from the outset, or 
is based on wishful thinking. Case 7 from DRC 
gives a good example of this. Where budget 
projections are made these tend to assume 
optimistic usage and are frequently made 
without any consultation of potential users. As 
one case study quoted project developers:
“We did not have a business model. Who would 
pay? How much should they be charged? How 
would they pay? We eventually realised that 
farmers could not pay.”
Young ICT app developers in ACP countries 
need support in developing business models to 
enable them to market their ICT4Ag services, 
yet these are often not easy to access. One private 
service indicated that it had been unable to 
identify any source of business advice and 
suggested that ACP countries should be 
promoting business incubator services to mentor 
young developers and provide them with 
business advice.
Several projects had plans to attract 
advertisements but advertisers are only interested 
when a significant audience can be guaranteed. 
Recognising the inability of many small farmers 
to pay for information, some services decided 
on a two-tier approach whereby simple 
information would be provided free of charge 
and more detailed information would be subject 
to a fee. But they found the number of 
subscribers to the fee-paying service to be very 
limited. 
Early Market Information Services (MIS), 
which initially disseminated price information 
to farmers through newspapers, encountered 
problems of illiteracy and poor newspaper 
distribution. Subsequently, MIS began to use 
the radio but national radio stations were 
unsuitable for providing information on a wide 
range of products in many locations. The rapidly 
expanding number of FM stations often proved 
too expensive as the stations usually insisted on 
being paid to broadcast prices rather than 
regarding them as a public service. Attempts to 
generate revenue by organising sponsorship of 
price broadcasts were rarely successful. 
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Thus the arrival of mobile phones with text 
capability was quickly seized on by MIS as a 
way of disseminating information. This speeded 
up data transmission and allowed it to be 
targeted to those who really need it, but 
problems still remained. A business model that 
would enable MIS to cover their costs from fees 
charged to farmers for the text or voice messages 
or from advertisements has yet to emerge. 
With widespread access to mobile phones, 
farmers now have the capacity to call traders or 
other buyers in order to find out the prevailing 
price. These calls also offer the opportunity to 
discuss matters such as collection/delivery and 
payment arrangements, enabling the farmer to 
decide who to sell to on the basis of several 
variables, including price. Thus it may be no 
surprise that some recent research suggests poor 
impact of SMS-based services9. None of the 
case studies used for this report looked at a 
traditional MIS approach. The closest was 
N’KALÔ in Côte d’Ivoire (Case 4), which 
provided a text message service to the country’s 
cashew growers but found that the maximum 
of 160 characters in a text was insufficient to 
convey both prices and explanations for price 
trends. As a result it changed over to using voice 
messages targeted at a more restricted farmer 
organisation audience.n
iHub Nairobi’s Innovation Hub is a tech community facility with a focus on young 















Mobile Agribiz was an online support service for farmers in DRC. It was established by a team of developers in 
2010. After its introduction the developers quickly 
realised that what they were offering was 
inappropriate for smallholders in the country. 
Drawing on the lessons learned they redesigned 
the service and relaunched it in 2012, with some 
success.
The first version of Mobile Agribiz was a web 
application that aimed to help farmers decide when 
to plant crops and to identify crops and varieties to 
plant in a particular agro-climatic zone. It also 
intended to connect farmers to buyers. However, 
only a small number of farmers used the service, 
representing about one percent of the farmers in 
the pilot region of 50,000 farmers. Reasons 
identified for this included the existence of only 
one internet café in the region, the high cost of 
using computers where they were available, and the 
illiteracy of many farmers. Requiring farmers to 
establish an online account also raised suspicions 
amongst the farmers that information provided 
would reach the hands of the authorities. Developing 
content in the local language for those able to read 
and write was complicated by the fact that most 
material available was only available in French or 
English. The plan to link farmers to buyers also 
attracted very little interest from traders.
The developers admitted that they should have 
initially consulted farmers to identify their needs. 
Further, they had no business model, with no clear 
idea of who they would charge, how they would 
charge them or how much they should charge. They 
had no plans for marketing the service. They noted 
that DRC had no business incubators to provide 
advice and that it was only after they received 
support from an external business training 
organisation that they had a clearer idea of what 
needed to be done.
Country: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Implementing party: Private initiative
Type of service: Web
Project duration: 2010 – present
Source: Mbunzama, Narcisse: L’analyse de la problématique de l ’échec de l ’adoption de  TIC pour l ’agriculture, cas de la 
première version de Mobile Agrobusiness en République Démocratique du Congo.
Mobile Agribiz:  Onl ine support to farmers
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Providing training, promotion and 
awareness of the tools
Developers cannot expect to introduce an ICT4Ag service and find that the 
planned beneficiaries all immediately start using it. First, the farmers need to 
know that it exists. Second, they need to know how to use it, as do those meant to 
advise them. 
CHAPTER 8 
Project budgets sometime underestimate or ignore the training requirements needed for an ICT service to work. 
Training is required at all levels, from those 
supervising the service, to field-level staff and 
the farmers benefitting from it. This training 
can involve considerable cost, including the cost 
of travel necessary for extension staff to reach 
rural areas to train farmers. 
Several projects experienced problems with 
computer literacy of those responsible for 
implementation. This mainly involved extension 
staff in rural areas being unable to use computers 
to retrieve extension advice for farmers. In Kenya 
(Case 1), a 2013 survey conducted among 81 
small-scale farmers in Kakamega district five 
years later, revealed that 84 percent of them were 
unaware of the availability of the service and as 
a result had never used it; officials from KSC 
were aware of the application but had to refer 
to brochures for information; and agricultural 
extension officers were aware of the service but 
were not conversant with the short codes and 
did not have brochures or materials to refer to. 
With the Zambian case (Case 8), headquarter 
staff who were supposed to respond to SMS 
questions from farmers also experienced 
difficulties in using ICTs.
It is also vital for ICT4Ag services to be well 
promoted but this was rarely budgeted for in 
most of the cases reported. Extension workers 
can play an important promotional role and 
training on this can be carried out at the same 
time as training on implementation of the ICT. 
Promotion can also be carried out through 
farmer organisations and by using radio 
advertisements, although these can be expensive. 
More imaginative approaches that can combine 
promotion and training include setting up stalls 
in rural centres on market days or having a stall 
at an agricultural fair. n 
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CASE 8
Taking advantage of the rapid rise in mobile phone use in Zambia, the National Agricultural Information Services (NAIS), 
a unit of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock 
developed a service that would allow farmers to 
keep in touch with subject-matter specialists. The 
SMS service had its origins in the Radio Farm 
Forum Groups, developed earlier by NAIS 
throughout the country. Farmers listened to radio 
programmes about agriculture, discussed the 
contents and sent comments and queries using 
paper forms to NAIS in Lusaka. However, the 
feedback often took a long time to reach the farmers. 
The pilot SMS service was seen as a way of speeding 
up the flow of information. 
NAIS initially partnered with the International 
Institute for Communication and Development 
(IICD) and a local Zambian technology company 
SMSize (now called Chibanje Mobile) to develop 
a service to which farmers sent a question by SMS, 
allowing NAIS agricultural specialists to reply to 
the sender’s phone in the same local language as 
the original request. 
In the text, farmers were expected to put “NAIS, a 
language code, a space, and then the question”, a 
system which proved difficult in an area with high 
levels of illiteracy. Training of farmers in its use was 
not carried out as NAIS staff meant to be doing 
the training had no resources for travelling to rural 
areas. A lack of awareness among farmers about the 
existence of the NAIS SMS-platform and its 
telephone number was also cited as one of the 
reasons why farmers were not using the NAIS 
platform. Farmers also found the cost of the texts 
too high. 
To alleviate some of these problems, the Connect-
for-Change (C4C) consortium of IICD together 
with its preferred technology supplier Text to 
Change (TTC) attempted to stabilise the 
technology and user-side of the service during late 
2013 and 2014. However, organisational challenges 
such as responsiveness of the NAIS team to external 
stakeholders, shortage of IT skills and resource 
pressures within NAIS continued to influence the 
sustainability of the service. The NAIS interactive 
SMS service is still live in its current form with 
C4C support10, but future viability post-donor 
support remains to be seen.
Country: Zambia
Implementing parties: National Agricultural Information Services (NAIS); International Institute for Communication and Development (IICD)
Type of service: SMS
Project duration: 2011 – present
Source: Tembo, Stephen and Jonathan Mwamba: Challenges of scaling up the National Agriculture Information Service 
(NAIS) Short Messaging System (SMS) platform in Kasama district, Northern Province, Zambia.
SMS for agricultural  extension
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Resolving internal and external 
responsibilities in implementing 
the service 
As with all development activities, good policies are central to successful ICT4Ag 
growth. There are many competing claims for limited government resources 
and policymakers therefore need to be kept fully informed of a service’s success. 
Partnerships can be a major factor in a project’s success but if too many people 
are involved it may become difficult to manage. 
CHAPTER 9 
An enabling environment is vital for development. The explosion in mobile phone usage in ACP countries has come 
about, in large part, because governments have 
liberalised the telecommunications sector, 
thereby allowing private companies to compete 
to supply phones and networks that people find 
affordable. Despite these successes, governments 
should be aware that other regulations may 
constrain further growth of the ICT sector by, 
for example, inhibiting innovation or limiting 
network expansion. Regarding ICT4Ag, national 
and local governments, once they have endorsed 
a new project, need to provide consistent support 
to its implementation.
Resource constraints can be caused by a lack of 
senior management understanding or buy-in of 
the project. Unless kept regularly informed of 
project progress and, in particular, its positive 
impact, managers, both government and private, 
may see no need to support ongoing operational 
costs. The more they know about a good activity, 
the less likely they will be to pull the plug. 
Managers also need to be aware of the 
consequences of frequent staff rotations. This 
had major implications for one of the cases 
studied, where most people who had been 
trained were suddenly transferred to new jobs. 
Some political and social systems do not seem 
conducive to development of new initiatives. 
Where leadership of local organisations is subject 
to political appointment, a lack of interest in 
successful implementation on the part of 
managers has been reported. An ICT project in 
Tanzania designed to help people report broken-
down water pumps failed, in part, because of a 
cultural reluctance to criticise the authorities11.
Several projects involved a wide range of 
stakeholders. This has both strengths and 
The explosion in mobile phone usage in ACP 
countries has come about, in large part, 
because governments have liberalised the 
telecommunications sector, thereby allowing 
private companies to compete to supply 
phones and networks that people  
find affordable
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weaknesses. It does enable the project to more 
easily call on a variety of skills and even 
supplementary funding. For example, the lack 
of knowledge about agriculture of most ICT 
specialists argues for management by a team 
with broad expertise. On the other hand, 
complicated management teams give no 
flexibility to make speedy changes, as discussed 
in Case 9 from Uganda. 
The lesson is, perhaps, that partnerships should 
be entered into only when there are clear 
advantages from doing so. In rural areas, working 
closely with key community leaders can do much 
to improve a project’s acceptability. n
Regarding ICT4Ag, national and local 
governments, once they have endorsed a 
new project, need to provide consistent 
support to its implementation















Electronic Uganda National Innovations Systems (EUNAIS) was developed in 2009 to increase the effectiveness of Uganda’s 
National Agricultural Research System (NARS) 
by providing a linkage between smallholder farmers 
in rural areas of Western Uganda and technical 
experts able to provide advice on upgrading farmers’ 
production skills. Farmers were also trained in 
developing their own content in their local language 
and managing their own website. EUNAIS also 
aimed to help farmers identify new market 
opportunities for their production. The plan was to 
use a variety of ICTs, particularly a call centre. 
Available data and field research had indicated that 
around two-thirds of farmers owned a mobile phone.
The system enabled farmers calling the centre to 
follow automated voice prompts to choose the 
language and then leave a message requesting 
information on any agricultural topic. They would 
then receive an answer from a relevant expert. 
Unfortunately, the EUNAIS system was used by 
relatively few farmers and, despite further promotion 




Makere University; Commonwealth of Learning (COL); International Center for Tropical Agriculture 
(CIAT); United States Agency for International Development (USAID); University of Nairobi; 
University of Florida
Type of service: Call centre
Project duration: 2009 – 2011
Source: Ndagire, Alice: Voice for the Voiceless Rural Farmer in Uganda.
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The low usage of the service was attributed in part 
to widespread illiteracy in rural areas, combined 
with farmers’ hesitancy about using new technology 
for certain activities, despite having already 
embraced mobile phones. Farmers were particularly 
reluctant to use the service to attempt to sell 
products, preferring the traditional way of meeting 
buyers in local markets. Rapid response by EUNAIS 
to adapt to such problems was constrained by the 
large number of stakeholders involved in the project 
and the consequent difficulty in making quick 
decisions.
It became clear that the costs of EUNAIS were far 
too high. The project became dependent on several 
foreign donors who, in turn, were reluctant to offer 
further funding because there was no obvious 
government buy-in. This was in spite of encouraging 
increases in usage as the word spread among farmers. 
The multiplicity of donors also led to slow decision-
making.





Makere University; Commonwealth of Learning (COL); International Center for Tropical Agriculture 
(CIAT); United States Agency for International Development (USAID); University of Nairobi; 
University of Florida
Type of service: Call centre
Project duration: 2009 – 2011
Source: Ndagire, Alice: Voice for the Voiceless Rural Farmer in Uganda.



















ICT4Ag developers need to keep policy makers and donors regularly informed to maintain support.
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Further reading
Addom, Benjamin, 2012: Blogs on ICTs and 
Agriculture.  
https://benjaminkaddom.wordpress.com/
Barnett, Inka, 2012: Failed ICT development projects: 
Sweeping it under the carpet and moving on?  
http://tinyurl.com/pa6ke68
Burrell, Jenna and Elisa Oreglia, 2014: The Myth of 
Market Price Information: Mobile Phones and 
Epistemology in ICTD.  
http://tinyurl.com/qzhnys8
CTA, 2014: ICTs for Agriculture – Making it happen.  
http://tinyurl.com/p254mzd
World Bank, 2012: ICT in Agriculture Sourcebook. 
http://tinyurl.com/q4nxhg3
Endnotes
1. Two case study proposals not funded by CTA 
noted the following as reasons for ICT projects: 
“….because the farmers are victims of the rule of 
the intermediary, who buys the product at a low 
price to sell more expensively….” and “…to 
reduce the selfish interest that middlemen 
exercise in the market with subversive tendencies 
like hoarding and undue price elevations.”
2. See, for example, Burrell and Oreglia, 2014 with 
reference to the use of cell phones by Ugandan 
fishermen on Lake Victoria.
3. http://tinyurl.com/zpx9gmr
4. Groupe Speciale Mobile Association: Guidelines 
for Creating Agri VAS Content   
http://tinyurl.com/obtmn2a
5. Easy SMS, an innovative app to translate text 
into voice and pictures, which was announced in 
2012 for smartphone use, does not appear to 
have been introduced commercially   
http://tinyurl.com/pylqzcz
6. Mark Davies, personal communication
7. http://tinyurl.com/obsbuop
8. http://tinyurl.com/q52dmto
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international institution of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of 
States and the European Union (EU). Its mission is to advance food and nutritional 
security, increase prosperity and encourage sound natural resource management in 
ACP countries. It provides access to information and knowledge, facilitates policy 
dialogue and strengthens the capacity of agricultural and rural development institutions 
and communities. CTA operates under the framework of the Cotonou Agreement 
and is funded by the EU.
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